- TransLiesMatter : /h/jeetcontainmenthole
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Prelude:
this cute twink has an open mic show where he, with his guest panel, bullies the participants who bomb. sadly, the show is funny and has the charm of old school hazing
Act 1:
characters: AIB , Mumbai Police
, Ranveer Singh
AIB was a skit comedy-satire collective and back in 2015 organized a roast show (tired copied concept i know) of Ranveer Singh (and another fella). the thing went viral...leading to police complaints, apology letters, video bans, media debate blah blah. the hot topic in contention - vulgarity. @Sasanka_of_Gauda 's favourite party, BJP, wants to maintain their monopoly on the right to be potty mouth and they made a huge hue & cry
nah, it was an across the aisle issue
writer's notes: AIB planted the flag of edgy comedy india by surviving this onslaught but couldnt cross the torrent of metoo
Act 2:
characters: Samay Raina , Ranveer Allahbadia
Samay Raina is a big chess streamer/comedian/kashmiri pandit/edgelord who likes to create parody game shows with his audience. he has been hated by the left wing for his "misogny" and love for the right govt. (he's a normal centrist tbh). he once made a fear factor + the dictator mashup where he would just eliminate players on whim calling "life is unfair". (beast games before it was cool). he one one fateful morning decided to copy.....kill tony and mix it with america's got talent. the participant has to perform, predict his score and is rewarded on the basis of their self awareness
the show blew up for its golden age unscripted game show honesty. it seriously BLEW, beyond the target audience and celebrities started clamouring to join the next cool thing. streaming websites offered money to buy the rights, live shows were getting sold out, kids were buying youtube memberships, haters were name dropping it to get views
the character 2, Ranveer Allahabadia, is the indian r-slurred joe rogan + logan paul. he used to make nofap nonsense before transitioning to clickbait podcasts. and i swear by god, HE MADE MONEY. the most braindead content with aliens, yeti, ghosts there was no r-slur grifter on internet that he had not interviewed. the people with brain hate him for that. the right wing govt, BJP, approched him to do their propaganda during elections and my man counted cash. the left wing hates him for that. the rest of youtuber hate him for his clout
ACT 3:
characters: samay raina , ranveer allahabadia
, mumbai police
on the 10 year anniversary of AIB roast, when the stars aligned, my neighbor released his episode with Ranveer Allahbadia as guest. and something happened. on the show, there was some homophobic participant and the guests were grilling him by asking what if his son would turn out gay, "would you suck my peepee for 10 mil?", "what bout 20 mil?". in the flow and def due to being drunk, my man RA to fit in with other comics pulled out an old copied stinker "would you rather watch your parents have s*x or join it once to stop it forever?"
left wing clipped it to defame the right wing govt about their association with such "vulgar" people. the right wing ( @Sasanka_of_Gauda basically) went in apeshit overdrive to kill the connection by metaphorically killing the man themselves. other indians joined in their favourite passtime after r*pe, mob lynching. chief ministers of several states are personally name dropping them, police is raiding their computers, rounding up everyone from the day 1 episode 1, opportunists are planning to introduce censorship laws, libertarian right wings are clenching their jaws over their low iq compatriots, people are using "motherlover" while condemning incestuous jokes. RA is crying and apologizing. meanwhile Samay Raina is touring US while chilling cuz "life is unfair". zoomers are seething over their skibidi potty going away. media is making shit up literally to fill airtime. parliamemtary committees are being formed
https://old.reddit.com/r/indiasgotlatent/new
Instead of filing FIR and arresting Ranveer, use this opportunity to regulate vulgar content on OTT and YouTube. There is widespread outrage among the public, and they will gladly support such laws.
— Rishi Bagree (@rishibagree) February 11, 2025
Don't squander this opportunity.
It is not a solution to just ignore the things that offend you.. Normalising unethical behaviour is not at all acceptable, since it creates negative and long term impact on the society.. social platforms, movies, short films, etc. promoting vulgarity should be completely banned.
— Nishantmwagh♥️🦁 (@Nishantmwagh1) February 12, 2025
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Background: The enshittification of Argentina
This could be an effortpost purely on its own but I leave that task to our great friends from the southern hemisphere.
Argentina's July 9, 1989, Independence Day was historical for two opposing reasons. For the first time since 1928, a democratically elected president had been succeeded by another elected one—leaving aside the Peronista reelection in 1952. But this much-longed-for event happened amid feared, raving hyperinflation. (Nothing new ever happens). Stepping down was Raul Alfonsin, who had become president on December 10, 1983 following a violent military government that had taken power with a coup on March 1976, the SIXTH since 1930.
Even though Argentina had been ridden with inflation for several decades, it still became more chaotic (proving no matter how shitty you think your positions are, it can still get shittier when it comes to economics) after a mega-devaluation and mega-tariff shock in June 1975 by the Minister of Economy Celestino Rodrigo, which infamously became known as the Rodrigazo. (Dude Spanish LeMayo)
Nine months later, after the coup, the military immediately tried to tame inflation with traditional IMF counter-cyclical measures, but to no avail. From the so-called hilariously named Rodrigazo, the country would live under what became known as a "high-inflation regime": verging on a 100 percent year rate of minimum inflation, but in most years, well over that level.
Note that In these situations, inflation almost becomes an index exchange That is, there would be inflation because investors have priced it in already, as in inflation in future because inflation in past.
Pic rel: you walk into Argentina's Central Bank
So in 1978, the Argentinian government, fresh from the high off of winning the FIFA WC, introduced their most radical plan till date: la tablita
La Tablita ("the little chart") was a 1978 stabilization policy, a pre-gradual devaluation scale schedule combined with an external opening of financial and trade sectors. In the prevailing abundant, low-cost, international credit environment, large amounts of capital entered the country, pressing the national peso down, checking inflation, and cheapening imports.
Unfortunately, God hates Argentina and the retards who run Argentina hate the country even more.
@nuclearshill be like
Despite bringing down inflation, La Tablita was far from ending it. Hence, the peso appreciation became considerable, damaging domestic industrial goods.
On top of that, the foundations of this pyramid scheme, however, were highly frail. It depended on the continuous availability of cheap dollar credit in international markets, something challenging to happen. Thus speculation against the peso grew. Spurred on by higher dollar rates and made possible by financial openness, many external and internal investors thrived on this terms of a "financial bicycle."
To avoid the abrupt end of La Tablita, the government itself took external debt—mainly through state-owned companies—and made them available to speculative private agents or tried to gain their confidence by increasing the stock of international reserves.
The Arabs coming out to nuke Argentina in the ass
After the 1979 Volcker shock because of the Arab oil embargo crisis, that raised dollar interest rates, the mounting dollar debt cycle became explosive. The dollar shortage led to a run on banks and a financial crisis in 1980, which the government had to save with rediscounts. The government established an official guarantee on deposits and, in February 1981, abandoned the Tablita schedule. Following an exceptional 10 percent devaluation of the peso, a new monthly devaluation chart was announced— greater than the original one, but insignificant in view of the accumulated appreciation in the exchange rate. In March 1981, it ended any kind of Tablita scheme and a new 30 percent devaluation was applied.
After years of making new deals (with the US; mercosur, with the IMF) and failing to keep any of the promises they made and finally coming to terms with its thirdworldness, in April 1988, the government declared a moratorium on the service of foreign debt. This led to losing the support of the IMF. Hence, the only resource of fresh dollars left was the World Bank. (aka 3rd world support).
The Spring Plan launched just months before the 1989 election, was a stabilization program conceived with the modest purpose of avoiding the hyperinflationary outburst before the presidential election in May 1989. Without being able to adjust tariffs because of their inflationary effects and without being able to tax, the government made a price agreement with the leading companies, which resulted in the reduction of the value-added tax from 18 percent to 15 percent, which led to a 0.5% drop off in GDP. In mere months.
However, the election itself was the main factor of instability. The three leading presidential candidates (including Eduardo Angeloz, from the official party) called for the exchange rate liberalization. Peronist Carlos Menem, who widely led the polls, defied any justification of restraint, stating that it would interrupt external payments for 3 to 5 years, cut taxes 50 percent and give out a salariazo (100 percent increase in wages), among other populist and nationalist measures. Thus, exchange rate and fiscal instability are combined with political uncertainty. In retrospect, the only chance of The Spring Plan to reach its goal resided in the remote chance of a reversal of election polls in favor of the official candidate. Otherwise, with a foreseeable triumph of the opposing candidate, announcing a populist and nationalist platform, an abrupt run of funds to the dollar was unavoidable.
Fearing the inevitable the World Bank withdrew its support in January 1989.
The consumer price index, around 7 percent per month during the last quarter of 1988, doubled in March 1989 and again in April. Two months later, it was out of control.
Menem won in the midst of all this pandemonium. The handover of command was planned for December, but the outlook for the next five months was chaotic. Hence, the succession was brought forward for July 8.
The failed attempts to privatize several companies, the continuous erosion of public income due to inflation, the freezing of wages with high unemployment that intensified social discontent, with some goods-shortage, additional power cuts due to droughts that affected the hydroelectric plants, and the appearance of looting in Greater Buenos Aires, all combined to fuel the severe crisis.
With the change of government, inflation fell rapidly, but only momentarily. Amid prices still going out of control, a temporal confiscation of bank deposits was made, forcedly exchanging them with government treasury bonds (the Bonex plan). After two further hyperinflationary outbreaks between 1990 and 1991, new economic minister Domingo Cavallo could finally curb rising inflation with a radical currency board-style convertibility of the Argentinian peso (rebranded as The Austral in the mid 80s) to the American dollar.
The Uruguay Angle
What is an Uruguay?
Like all normal Americans, I had zero knowledge where Uruguay was, how much does one Uruguayan foid cost etc important questions before I started reading about them. Looking at them, few of us would envy them.
As Menem's Argentina was finally realizing its retarded policies, like Menem's Argentina during the 1990s, Uruguay had embarked upon a full-scale liberalization of its economy through liberalization of the capital and current account on the balance of payments. Uruguay's banking system was based on local private-owned banks, foreign banks, and large public banks.
During the 1990s, the Uruguayan economy performed relatively well; by the decade's end, it was a middle-income country with a per-capita income of US$6000. In 1999 the Uruguayan economy suffered a significant economic recession that resulted in multiple implications for the country's fiscal debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the profitability and liquidity of the banking sector.
The twin devaluation of the Brazilian and Argentinian currency near Y2K hit the competitive position of Uruguay's exports and led to a currency appreciation. Like any other 3rdworldie, it immediately set conditions to terminate the exchange rate commitment of the Uruguayan currency that had helped stabilize the public debt during the 1990s. As a result of the 1999 prolonged recession, it was registered first as a major fiscal crisis, recession-triggered revenue reductions led the government deficit to surge from 38 percent of GDP in 1998 to 58 percent of GDP by 2001. By 2001 the public sector debt amounted to roughly US$107 billion.
This consecutively increased the country's dependence on foreign capital and investors: the deepening of the public deficit caused by the fiscal crisis forced Uruguay to issue foreign currency-denominated bonds and debt certificates to finance the Uruguayan debt.
By December 2001, both liabilities and assets of the Uruguayan banks were highly dollarized. (Nearly 83% of public debt was in foreign currency). For reference if the US had that problem today, that would mean nearly 31 Trillion Dollars of debt in Chinese/Japanese/Euro currencies.
On the liability side, liquid foreign currency deposits amounted to 90 percent of total deposits, of which 47 percent were deposits by non-residents. On the asset side, about 75 percent of total loans were denominated in foreign currencies. By the time the crisis began, the two largest public banks (Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay (BROU) and Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay (BHU)) (ching chong names, just remember BROU and BHU) lay in critical financial condition because their ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was on average 39.1 percent, compared to 5.6 percent for the private banks.
This chicanery along with growing share of total debt financed through issuing debt certificates abroad and in foreign currencies made the country and its banking sector extremely vulnerable to external shocks.
This came in the form of an Argentine shock
Throughout the postwar decades, Brazil and Argentina were the main trading partners of Uruguay. Argentina, even more than Brazil, was tied to the direction of the Uruguayan economy. As was the case with the early 1980s crisis, any time Argentina abandoned its price stabilization plan, the GDP of Uruguay contracted substantially. In contrast, any time Buenos Aires GDP declined, Uruguay's GDP grew modestly. (Exports needed, latina foids, if one fails, the other has to step up)
As the banking sectors of the two countries became interdependent. In particular, Argentinean savers and investment companies placed large amounts of funds with Uruguayan private and publicly owned banks. (Argentinians trusted their government so little, they were willing to invest in a tiny ass country, so much so that in time they became that country's main creditor ) The Uruguayan banks had become safe financial outlets for Argentinean savers. By the end of 2001, 45 percent of Uruguay's total deposits came from Argentinean investors.
Not only this, buy at the time, the two national public banks (BROU & BHU. Remember them? This is them now. Feel old yet?) were owned by Argentinean financial groups. How you call something that is neither nationalized nor publicly owned a national public bank beats me. But that's how definitions work in Uruguay. And these were not the only banks to have their shit rocked. All the largest Uruguayan banks were primarily exposed to either Buenos Aires' public debt or the largest Argentinean banking groups.
In December 2001, the Argentinean authorities approved capital controls and deposit freezes on Argentine nationals. This decision, coupled with the termination of Buenos Aires' currency pegging to the US dollar, prompted many Argentinean investors to withdraw funds from Uruguay, thus plummeting its financial sectors into a liquidity crisis. The two largest private banks of Uruguay, Banco de Galicia Uruguay and Banco Comercial, were hit the most by capital outflows. Banco de Galicia Uruguay, then the second largest Uruguayan bank by assets, was a subsidiary of Banco de Galicia, the largest Argentinean group. (Just sell the entire nation to Argentina faggots)
As its banking activities revolved by and large around taking deposits from Argentinean banks and companies and lending to the same type of clients, the freeze of deposits and the enforcement of capital controls hit Banco de Galicia Uruguay, which suddenly suffered from a liquidity crisis. This led the Central Bank of Uruguay to suspend its activities in February 2002. As much as Banco Galicia, Banco Comercial, the largest private bank of Uruguay, was overexposed to Argentine's borrowers: it held a large amount of the Argentinian government's public debt. It was a significant creditor to Grupo Banco General de Negocio, a leading financial holding in Argentina. In 2002, this two-fold overcommitment to Argentina was the leading cause of the liquidity crisis that shook Banco Comercial that year.
Banco is a funny word NGL 
By March, 12 percent of total bank deposits had been withdrawn, mostly by non-residents. This downward sloping trend continued even after the implementation of measures by the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to forestall the liquidity crisis. By May 2002, 18 percent more deposits had been withdrawn; this time, non-resident withdrawals were paired with money cashed by residents from public banks.
Why should Argentinians have all the fun?
- some Uruguayan(before jumping off a bridge after seeing an Argentinian doing it)
This faggotry reached its crisis point in July when the run on dollar deposits was coupled with a rush to cash local currency deposits. By mid-summer, most private banks had become insolvent; on the other hand, the public banks, though liquidity support provided by the IMF amounted to US$1,1221 million as of August 2002, suffered from significant liquidity imbalances and extremely precarious balance sheets.
In July, Uruguay's foreign currency reserves, which by December 2001 amounted to US$3.1 billion, reached the lowest level ever of US$650
$650
The crisis that erupted in 2002 had striking side effects on the Uruguayan currency, foreign exchange reserves, and the country's capability to service the public debt. Rather than merely affecting the liquidity position of Uruguayan private banks, massive capital outflows reduced the country's foreign exchange reserves.
Assuming the country's international reserves as of December 2001 as a benchmark, by the second half of 2002 they had declined by 80 percent. This decline in international reserves jeopardized the exchange rate commitment and, thus, the likelihood of servicing the public debt. (the only part that any government cares about beyond optics) This trajectory of the financial crisis led the Uruguayan authorities in July 2002 to halt the exchange rate commitment and to approve a 27 percent currency devaluation that led exports to temporarily bounce back by the end of 2002. But devaluation has a downside in terms of debt sustainability. The termination of the Uruguayan exchange rate commitment and its devaluation set the national debt to unsustainable limits.
The recurring deposit withdrawals that started in the first half of 2002 led to a credit crunch that triggered systematic curtailing of credit by private banks to the non-banking sector. During that year, banking credit to the non-financial sector contracted by 37 percent. Consecutively the GDP contracted by about 10%.
How the crisis was contained
Since the beginning, the crisis appeared to be a matter of liquidity shortage affecting a limited section of the banking system. Therefore, liquidity assistance to either the largest private banks of Uruguay or the foreign-owned banking institutions, as well as the public banks, represented an unfinished line of economic intervention by the Central Bank of Uruguay, the government, and the IMF, the three leading institutions that came to the rescue. Amidst a further deepening of the banking liquidity crisis in early summer, in July 2002 a new financial facility was established, the Fondo para la Fortificacion del Sistema Bancario, which amounted to US$2.5 billion.
it's okay little fella, here's some change. Keep it 
Notwithstanding the scale of this fund in July, both foreign exchange reserves and the liquidity of private banks got worse. On July 30, this Fondo's financial operations were suspended and a bank holiday began.
Crisista time? More like fiesta time 
Shortly after the removal of the bank holiday on August 5, 2002, a run on deposits began again. Amidst this seemingly neverending crisis, the government approved a law that, by combining an effort by the state finance with financial assistance provided by three leading international economic institutions—the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)—focused on both protecting dollar-denominated deposits in the country and initiating a suspension of the operations of the three largest private banks that paved the way for their restructuring or liquidation.
total banco destruction 
The new law made provision for having the BROU absorb all the foreign currency deposits and time deposits held at BHU and for suspending the operations of Banco Comercial, Banco de Montevideo-Caja Obrera, and Banco de Credito. In addition, it set conditions for their restructuring or liquidation in the future. By the beginning of fall 2002, this set of measures led to a decline in total withdrawals and a resurgence of deposits by residents, which by 2005 had returned to their July 2002 level. During the fall of 2002 and 2003, the second set of crisis management measures was undertaken to restructure public banks' debt and strengthen the structure of banking regulation and supervision in Uruguay, which was historically not well structured.
A selected number of loans by BROU, which throughout 2002 had lost roughly 66 percent of total deposits, were absorbed by a newly created state entity, while the bank's lending operations were redirected to peso-denominated operations. A credit risk-management mechanism was established to reduce non-performing loans. The BHU, whose dollar-denominated deposits accounted for 77 percent of total deposits while 94 percent of total loans were peso-denominated, was severely rocked by the peso's devaluation. The bank was radically restructured by the Ley del Fortalecimiento del Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay in December 2002, limiting its banking operation to housing saving plans and issuing of a limited number of mortgages, but prevented the BHU from taking deposits.
Concerning the private banks, the three largest institutions were liquidated. The Banco Comercial and Banco Montevideo Caja Obrera were placed under liquidation, and a new financial institution, Nuevo Banco Comercial, was established. The purpose of this new institution was to issue Certificates of Deposits to finance the acquisition of the assets of the two banks under liquidation.
Concerning the Banco de Credito, the third largest private bank, the government recapitalized it several times and then, in February 2003, placed it under liquidation.
This taking a chainsaw action on the financial side of the banking crisis was paired with legislative initiatives to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory system charged with presiding over the national banking system.
Another law was passed to strengthen the Central Bank of Uruguay so as to not leave it as toothless as the Argentinian beggar asylum of a CB.
That new law imposed new requirements on banking activities that included higher reserve requirements for deposits by non-resident investors, several rules to reduce foreign exchange risks and improve lending-decision making by national banks, and compulsory disclosure by banks of relevant financial information about their borrowers' credit solvency.
By the end of 2002, the liquidity crisis that hit the banking system had triggered a contraction of total bank deposits by residents by about 46 percent and a reduction of total deposits by foreign investors of 65 percent. As a result of the crisis, the country's GDP declined by 11 percent, whereas total public sector debt grew by 26 percent.
In this situation, many international investors (read US, nobody except the US government and investors knew about Uruguay outside Latin America) envisaged the possibility of a sovereign default in the wake of what happened in Argentina.
But credit (kek) where credit's due. The financial measures adopted to restructure and liquidate the banking system, coupled with several regulatory and supervisory initiatives aimed at preventing the country from future crises triggered by external shocks, placed the country on track to full recovery and prevented Uruguay from suffering terrible consequences in terms of inflation and deficit.
By 2003 GDP had risen by over 12 percent, inflation had declined to 10 percent, the financial system's deposits had regained US$800 million, and the primary surplus had once again soared to 4.1%.
Moral of the story - To this day the Uruguayan CB still has certain capital controls on investors from Argentina that it has not placed on anyone else. 
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This happened in 25 August 2010, when a Let L-410 Turbolet twin-engine short-range transport aircraft designed and produced by the Czech, crashed near Bandundu Airport. Of the 21 people onboard, all died, including the pilots, except one passenger, which is how we have any idea of WTF actually caused the crash!
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11087817
====(from BBC article)
A plane has crashed in the west of the Democratic Republic of Congo, killing 20 people, officials say.
One person was also critically injured as it came into land in Bandundu, about 200km (125 miles) west of the capital.
A BBC reporter in Kinshasa says it hit a house, but no-one is thought to have been hurt on the ground.
DR Congo, the size of western Europe, has few roads after decades of
civil war, and has one of the world's worst air safety records.
The BBC's Thomas Hubert says the plane crashed 2km from the airstrip as it attempted to land just after midday.
Colonel Joli Limengo, the local chief of police, told our correspondent that most of those on board had died in the accident, including the two pilots - who were believed to be Belgian nationals.
He said that 19 bodies were pulled from the wreckage along with two survivors, one of whom later died.
The aircraft was operated by Filair, an airline based in Kinshasa, and was due to stop over in Bandundu town before continuing its journey to the capital.
Our reporter says Filair, just like all airlines registered in DR Congo, is on the European Union's no-fly list because of the country's poor air safety record.
Transport Minister Laure-Marie Kawanda said a team had arrived in Bandundu to investigate the crash.
====(end quote)
Note that this was BEFORE the investigation by the Belgian authorities were carried out!
Initially the authorities were confused as to why the heck the plane had crashed, cuz usually when these types of small planes tanked it was cuz they were literally out of fuel
====(unknown AFP article)
Plane crashes in DRCongo, 20 dead: deputy governor
(AFP) – 4 days ago
KINSHASA — At least 20 people were killed after a plane flown by the Belgian head of a local airline crashed while trying to land in western Democratic Republic of Congo, officials said.
The Filair Czech-made twin turboprop crashed Wednesday afternoon at Bandundu after a 300-kilometre (200-mile) flight from the capital Kinshasa, and apparently running out of fuel, Vicky Mboso Muteba said.
"They have brought out the people, we have 19 bodies in the morgue," said Mboso, the deputy governor of Bandundu province, northeast of Kinshasa.
One of two survivors later died in hospital.
The owner of the private airline Filair, Belgian Daniel Philemotte, 62, was at the controls of the Let-410 plane and was among those killed, along with the co-pilot and stewardess, he added.
Mboso said that after an abortive attempt to land, the aircraft turned away and crashed towards the edge of Bandundu city, hitting an earthen house whose residents had managed to flee in time.
There was no explosion, said Mboso, who was one of the first to arrive on the site along with soldiers from MONUC, the UN mission in the Congo.
"Subject to expert opinion... the presumed cause could be a lack of fuel," he said.
====(end quote)
Basically people noted what was strange about this crash was that the fricking plane actually made an attempt to land, but aborted midway?! The authorities were also really puzzled wtf went wrong, cuz the pilot was a Eurocuck (and therefore actually competent, unlike the locals). And they also found the plane was completely full of fuel, so empty tanks weren't the cause, compared to what was the cause speculated when the news broke in Congo, as well as some minor Safrican foreign news outlets.
Here's a article google translated into Bonglish
https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2010/08/27/crash-de-bandundu-ville-la-version-de-fil-air/
From the 2 survivors, including the one poor soul whom would die in hospital later, the authorities gathered that there had appeared to be some kind of panic
aboard the plane, so close to the runway, causing all of the passengers to run towards the cockpit, unbalancing the small plane, and pulling the center of gravity, and making the aircraft near inoperable, which is why the pilot had managed to make one aborted attempt at landing, yet still pulled up at the last moment, to end up crashing it near the emergency landing strip of Bandundu Airport later!
====(from french article)
The crash of the Fil Air plane that occurred on Wednesday, August 25 in Bandundu City was not caused by a fuel shortage but rather by a technical failure before being thrown off balance by panicked passengers, indicated John Mbu, the consultant of this airline, forty-eight hours after the occurrence of this tragedy that killed around twenty people including the boss of the company, in the west of the DRC.
John Mbu explained:
"The statement of the only survivor, who was on the plane, said that the pilot had to land on the emergency strip located next to the runway. And that, when he arrived on final and had to point to land on the emergency strip, the passengers, having seen that his nose was not on the runway, screamed and all came into the cockpit."
As it was so close to landing, he continued, it threw the plane off balance and it swung before crashing into a house.
The hypothesis of running out of fuel is therefore not true, according to him, because after checking, there were still at least 150 litres of kerosene in the tanks.
However, regarding the technical breakdown, Fil Air was waiting until Friday evening for the expert report on the black box. This was recovered by civil aviation authorities and the transport ministry, the source said.
====(end quote)
So by this point the confused authorities understood there was some kind of last minute panic?
but they were still clearly uncertain WTF actually was the cause and were waiting for diagnoses of the Black Box
AND THEN:
It seems about 3-4 weeks later, when the sole survivor had recovered in the hospital from his injuries and could be questioned more clearly, and without delirium, that apparently fricking one of the passengers had smuggled a pet crocodile aboard, in a duffle bag. And that close to the end of the journey, the fricker apparently escaped, causing a panic shitstorm amongst the rest of the passengers, whom would flee to the opposite end of the aircraft in their headless panic
and frick up the center of gravity with such a sudden shift of weight!
====(from archived TheTelegraph article)
The plane came down despite no apparent mechanical problems during an internal flight in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has now emerged that the crash was caused by the concealed reptile escaping and causing a stampede in the cabin, throwing the aircraft off-balance.
A lone survivor apparently relayed the bizarre tale to investigators. The crocodile survived the crash, only to be dispatched with a blow from a machete.
According to the inquiry report and the testimony of the only survivor, the crash happened because of a panic sparked by the escape of a crocodile hidden in a sports bag. One of the passengers had hidden the animal, which he planned to sell, in a big sports bag, from which the reptile escaped as the plane began its descent into Bandundu.
A report of the incident said: "The terrified air hostess hurried towards the cockpit, followed by the passengers." The plane was then sent off-balance "despite the desperate efforts of the pilot", said the report.
====(end quote)
Even more hilarious is that the British Air Crash investigators didn't want to believe in the crocodile story and thought it was bullshit
and the fact that they couldn't get ahold of the flight-recording data from the Black Box (no idea why) made them sceptic to this story. But due to all the compounded factors, like the Belgian pilots being experienced, the plane being in good condition and fully fueled pre-crash made not good accounts for the cause of the crash outside the hearsay of the sole survivor, whom had little cause to lie.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/escaped-crocodile-congo-plane-crash
https://news.sky.com/story/croc-on-a-plane-reptile-may-have-caused-crash-10397037
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٢٢ بهمن برای ما ایرانیان، سرآغاز سقوطی دردناک به قعر جهنم جمهوری اسلامی است: کشور از مسیر پیشرفت و شکوفایی خارج شد؛ امت جای ملت را گرفت؛ به نام دین، آزادی به قتل رسید؛ بوستانها نابود و قبرستانها آباد شد؛ ناامنی و سرکوب و تبعیض به جای امنیت و نظم و قانون حاکم شد؛ زنان، شهروند… pic.twitter.com/hL8UzWIgL3
— Reza Pahlavi (@PahlaviReza) February 10, 2025
For us Iranians, 22 Bahman marks the beginning of a painful fall into the depths of the Islamic Republic's hell: the country fell from the path of progress and prosperity; the nation replaced the nation; freedom was murdered in the name of religion; parks were destroyed and cemeteries were built; insecurity, repression, and discrimination prevailed instead of security, order, and law; women became second-class citizens; freedom of religion was lost; and the apocalyptic illusions of a reactionary group linked the honorable name of Iran to chaos and terrorism; made Iran's national currency worthless day by day and our people poorer day by day. What happened in 2018 was the rebellion of the inauspicious alliance of red and black reaction against rationalism and patriotism.
That bitter fall is also a reminder that where we are is not our true place, contrary to what the devil's followers are telling us. There are still many among us who have experienced another Iranian, a prosperous Iranian, a safe Iranian, a respected Iranian, a free Iranian.
We cannot live in the past, but we can learn from it and be inspired to build an admirable future.
We both deserve a better situation and have shown that we have the ability to build a different Iran. Just as we once before, together as a united nation, we transformed Iran, which was on the verge of collapse, into a modern and prosperous country. We are the same great nation and descended from the same hardworking men and women.
It is from the combination of that successful past experience with the belief in a better future that the retaking of Iran from the non-Iranian regime has become a national desire.
Fellow countrymen,
The Islamic Republic is in its weakest and most ineffective days, and regional and global developments have also presented us with a historic opportunity. But this window of opportunity is not permanent.
With your support and desire, my compatriots, I stand in this field to overthrow the Zahhak of the times and his regime, and I have a clear and well-written plan to take back Iran and rebuild it: a five-point plan that defines both the path to victory and the roadmap for tomorrow's victory. We will carry out this campaign to liberate and save our homeland together in Iran and in the four corners of the world. As I have said many times, although we are looking for friends and allies in foreign capitals for this path, we know that our freedom will only come from our own hands.
Now is the time to act. It is time to liberate and save our motherland village by village, neighborhood by neighborhood, city by city, province by province from the evil clutches of the Islamic Republic. If you are ready, wherever you are, inside or outside, village or city, east or west, north or south, take a step towards victory, to put pressure on the regime, to support the national revolution of the Iranian people; Everyone does their part and as much as they can. The national revolution needs each and every one of us to win, Iran needs each and every one of us.
Payandeh Iran,
Reza Pahlavi
Backstory 
Til 1925 Persia was ruled by the Qajar dynasty, who by the end of things were weak and corrupt. A general from humblest provincial roots named Reza Shah seized power and declared himself first of the Pahlavi dynasty. Instead of at least patronizing Shiite crap he tried to modernize and westernize the country, emphasizing Iranian (newly renamed) history and nationalism, which caused strife with the largely traditional peasantry and Islamic clergy. Luckily Iran had oil enough to fund these major actions.
During WW2 the British and Soviets invaded and made him abdicate in lieu of his young son Muhammad Reza Shah. He would rule in various forms til 1979. Snazzy mofo
From the 40s til the early 50s, the country had elections. Obviously they went through parties and prime ministers like any third world shithole. In 1951 Mohammed Mossadegh, a popular reformist, won office. Him and the Shah fought for power, ousting each other, til Mossadegh came up on top. His big thing was nationalizing the British and American oil companies that were happily slurping up Persian oil for pennies. Bad idea nigga
Coup Time 
The CIA covertly regime changed him in 1953, returning the Shah to power. They got Arbenz (Guatemala) out the next year. Good decade for covert action. From then til '79 the Shah would rule as an absolute dictator.
Overall, it was a prosperous time for Iran. The GDP went way up, although much or most of the increase benefitted the Shah and his cronies. In 1971, to commemorate 2,500 years since the founding of Persia - the font of the Pahlavi clan's claimed legitimacy - a party was held on a scale of luxury never seen til then and not to be matched since.
This party took a year to plan, including:
- renovating an airport and building a new highway
- constructing an enormous 'tent' city (prefab luxury apartments with traditional Persian tent-cloth surrounds)
- planting hundreds of trees, flowers, and gardens in the desert, many imported from France
- satellite, telex and telephone connections worldwide... in 1971
- caterers from the world's elite restaurants, some of which closed for weeks
- 250 red mercedes-benz limousines. 50,000 birds. 10,000 turquoise and gold plates
During the days-long festivities 600 of the world's elite dined on the finest of foods, entertained by custom sound-and-light shows, specially-commissioned music, military parades, and of course prostitutes of every shape, size and color.
Perhaps the Shah was trying to outdo his distant predecessor, of whom the holy sages write:
Also, the cities were electrified, a new economy was nurtured in Persia, cultural norms liberalized and modern educational institutions were set up. From 1963 on, the Shah coopted many of Mossadegh's fun reforms to buttress popular support. Unfortunately the locals tended to focus on the crazy parties their betters were throwing over the fact their life had measurably improved. In fact, the new policies had the unfortunate effect of (1) congregating tons of conservative peasants in the cities, (2) weakening and angering traditional elites and the clergy, and (3) creating a powerless (under absolute monarchy) class of youth with their heads full of western words like communism and revolution who didn't appreciate the Shah's lux spending.
In responding to this by chasing away opponents, purging commies and imprisoning detractors, the Shah obviously made a lot of enemies. The Shiite imams became a focal point of dissent and organization for the disaffected masses.
1979 
Starting in 1978, riots, strikes and demonstrations paralyzed the country, mostly from the factors above, but also in response to extremely strong inflation since 1973 (thanks OPEC ), as well as the Shah's recent clumsy attempts at political liberalization. Reza Shah, of course, cracked down, but in a much nicer way than (say) Assad or Khamenei, who learned big lessons from his over-magnamity. Only a few thousand people died all year - his secret police preferred beatings, mild torture, exile, etc.
Much of the rioters' energy focussed on the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in convenient nearby exile in Iraq, whence he galvanized his supporters. The Shah pushed him on to France in late '78 but this backfired: his supporters, if anything, had better access to him there, Iraq's postal system leaving a lot to be desired vis-a-vis France. Also:
Surely the mild secular oppressor (🇮🇱) is much worse than the cool islamic mystic (🇯🇴) - western media
By 1979 Reza Shah was forced to pull an Assad and gtfo and Khomeini returned to Iran amidst cheering crowds. He proceeded to marginalize opposition groups like liberals and moderate islamists, purge his opponents and consolidate Iran into a brutal theocratic republic, whose horrors far outstripped and continue to outstrip anything the Shah ever did. Some examples:
- 1979-1981 hostage crisis, because the US let the exiked Shah receive medical treatment
- 1980-1988 war with Iraq, because they refused to give up Arab provinces to Iraq
(hundreds of thousands died)
- 1988 massacre of political prisoners, which in a few months killed more Iranians than Reza Shah during his whole regime
Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, "after suffering five heart attacks in ten days." Hope it hurt bozo
Return of the Sith 
Khomeini's chosen, hand-picked successor, the most qualified marja (senior Shiite cleric) in Iran, was a fellow named Montazeri. Sadly, he let it slip he was interested in reform and liberalization. Oops! The Islamists got together, threw Montazeri under house arrest and crowned Ayatollah Khamenei instead. Different guy, believe it or not, though the similarity probably helped illiterate peasants acclimate.
Starting in the 90s but intensifying significantly through 2010s, Iranians became very upset and disaffected with the regime. When the resource economy cyclically boomed all the money went to the oligarchs, and when it busted all the pain was felt by the common people. In addition, the hypocrisy of the mullahs and clergy was extremely obvious. These dudes would put on robes and turbans and proceed to do drugs, fornicate, steal money, etc. protected by the government and their religion, which under the I.R. model were one.
Major protests occurred in 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2011 etc. Some were national, others regional or minority focussed, but after each bloody crackdown and refusal to negotiate, peoples' attitudes hardened. The regime faced sanctions and was running out of funds and support. Hope seemed to be on the horizon.
Hope 
Barack Hussain Obama, DNC PMC HNIC of the US MIC, wanted an easy foreign policy win. Hating Israel due to his muzzie dad and liberal upbringing, he appointed a negotiator who, it turns out, was literally an Iranian spy. Malley had highest-level security clearance and even appointed other Iranian agents to the DOD and State Department. Whoops
The "agreement" that came out of these "negotiations" ended with Iran promising to be good boys and not make nukes in exchange for the US directly flying $400,000,000 USD in cash to the genocidal mullahs, plus another $1,300,000,000 later. Lotta zeros there
!chuds !nooticers did Iran proceed to spend this money on
A. peaceful development
B. oppression, corruption, and arming terrorists to kill Americans and Jews all across the world
Weigh in below!
Appendix A 
For your edification, a very non-exhaustive list of what Obama's besties got up to before and after the deal:
1983 - bombing 1983 - bombings 1983 - bombings, hijackings 1984 - bombing 1985 - bombings 1998 - hijacking 1992 - bombing 1992 - assassination 1994 - bombing 1996 - bombing 1998 - bombings 2000 - bombing 2002 - smuggling 2003 - bombings 2005 - assassination 2009 - smuggling 2011 - smuggling 2011 - assassination 2012 - bombing 2012 - bombings 2014 - smuggling 2018 - bombing 2021 - bombing 2022 - assassination
Islamic terrorism (prior to and since the Sunni Al Qaida/ISIS) was almost entirely Iran and its Arab proxies. As an "Islamic Republic" supporting these random shitstirring streetshitters became Iran's entire foreign policy to this day. For a while in the late 2010s, their non-state partners ruled, outright or in practice, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen - a significant swath of the middle east. Obama basically handed them Iraq, on top of hundreds of millions of your money.
After the Deal 
The Iranian people kept rioting, hating their government so strongly they began to slaughter its most sacred cows: Islam, the anti-Shah revolution, antisemitism, etc.
Islam: 73% want to separate religion and governance. Barely 37% identify as Shiite or Sunni (according to the Islamic Republic 99.5% are muslim); only 30% believe in heaven and hell, outrageously low numbers for the middle east. Considering the religious are likely the oldest sector of the population, this bodes extremely poorly for Islam as a whole in Iran. 8% profess Zoroastrianism, swapping Islamic rites for fire weddings and revived ancient Persian holidays. This self-identification isn't actually accepted by real Zoros (who are almost extinct) but who's counting?
Specifically to spite Shiite islam, guys knock off clergymen's hats and girls rip off their hijabs, and sometimes more
The Shah: The 2016 protests were actively monarchist in nature: imagine such a thing anywhere else in the world. Most Iranians have begun to revere the Shah's heir, Reza Pahlavi (#2 obviously). Like a battered wife fleeing to a DV shelter and ending up abused by trannies and hobos, the Iranian people have begun to crave their former master.
Israel: Especially during the 2022 but also before and since, many Iranians in and outside Iran bravely resisted the Islamic/liberal hivemind. They flew Israeli flags and generally supported Israel. Whether this is sincere or just "enemy of my enemy" remains to be seen, but it's a welcome development for lovers of truth, peace and justice. Within Iran they risk severe sanctions for this, but even there, they refuse to do things like place their shoes on the Israeli flags which their government lays out as an insult
Today 
All this was intro to the actual news of the week, which is that His Royal Highness, til now just tweeting vague and lovely pro-democracy stuff and living large on his family's wealth, has officially ordered his Iranian subects to RISE UP AND OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT
44 cities have seen actions and demonstrations; there are widespread ongoing protests.
Other fun stuff:
https://old.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1inq5s6/turban_tossing_has_returned_video_is_apparent/ https://old.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1ine3gs/breaking_iranians_from_the_city_of_kermanshah/ https://old.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1in6g8l/an_important_message_to_the_leader_of_the_free/ https://old.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/1imltj8/once_again_brave_iranians_made_a_home_made_flag/
The regime's weak both internally - from protests and apathy - and externally, having lost Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Obama / Biden money spigot. US and Israeli glowies seem to be banking on now as the time to strike, as seen reading between the lines in media pieces and tweets like Mr. Reza's.
What will happen
On the one hand, Iran and its bandit regime has survived every shock and protest for 46 years, including most recently the '22 protests, which fizzled out. These new protests aren't super impressive, at least yet. On the other hand, it only took HTS 11 days to conquer a country it and fifteen other factions had fought over for more than a decade. Clearly longevity doesn't mean much in the middle-eastern context; the Pahlavis ruled for 54 years, the Assads for 53...
Conclusion
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