Buzzword is, itself, a buzzword now.

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And the jews were before, during and after the war. You can't explain that.

Yeah, let's pretend the US didn't funnel an absurd amount of supplies to the soviet union.

Allied supplies of powder and explosive materials also played an important role. We assess the production of explosive materials in the USSR during the period from mid-1941 to mid-1945 as approximately 600,000 tons. No less than 295,600 tonne of explosive materials were supplied by the US. In addition, 22,300 tons of powder were supplied by Great Britain and Canada. Thus, Western deliveries of explosive materials reached 53 per cent of the total volume of Soviet production.

For example.

All true, but let's not pretend Patton didn't have the cossacks on their heels. Also, let's not forgot the two atom bombs we dropped on Japan making them obsolete. If we hadn't entered WWII Britain would be a German colony right now, and Europe would be Europa.

Hitler thought the end game would be some giant clash with the united states as well:

Building naval strength was less urgent, since Hitler’s main aim in the short to medium term was the conquest of Europe, and above all Eastern Europe. But in the long term, as he had indicated in his unpublished second book, he envisaged a titanic transcontinental clash with the United States, and for this a large navy would be necessary. In the spring of 1937 he increased the number of battleships to be constructed from four to six, to be completed by 1944. In addition there were to be four pocket battleships (changed in 1939 to three battle cruisers), and the pace of construction increased sharply as the threat of war with Britain loomed ever closer. Expenditure on the navy rose from 187 million Reichsmarks in 1932 to 497 two years later, 1,161 million in 1936 and 2,390 million in 1939. In 1936 ship construction accounted for nearly half of all naval expenditure, though this had sunk to under a quarter by the eve of the war, as men were drafted in to crew the new fleet and munitions were manufactured for the new guns to fire. Even in 1938 the planned fleet was thought to require six million tonnes of fuel oil a year and two million of diesel oil, in a situation in which total German consumption of mineral oils stood at six million, of which less than half was produced at home. Plans for the expansion of the air force were even more ambitious, and came up rapidly against very similar constraints. Overriding the objections of the army and navy, which saw airplanes as little more than support forces, Hitler created a Reich Aviation Ministry on 10 May 1933 under Hermann Goring, himself a former fighter pilot. Göring, aided by his talented and energetic state secretary Erhard Milch, a former director of the Lufthansa airline, immediately adopted a plan drawn up by another Lufthansa director, Robert Knauss, that envisaged an independent air force designed to fight a two-front war against France and Poland. Long-range bombers were the key to success, argued Knauss. By 1935 aircraft production had been reorganized, with many firms making components, thus saving the time of the big manufacturers such as Junkers, Heinkel or Dornier. Defensive fighters were soon added to the Ministry’s targets. In July 1934 a long-term programme envisaged the manufacture of more than 2,000 fighters, another 2,000 bombers, 700 dive-bombers, over 1,500 reconnaisance aircraft and thousands more training aircraft by the end of March 1938. By 1937, however, iron and steel shortages were beginning to have a serious effect on these ambitious plans. Constant changes in the design of bombers slowed things down further. Aircraft production actually fell from 1937 to 1938, from around 5,600 to 5,200.101

When we got the submarine codes, the German U-boats began dropping like flies, the German Navy went from top of their class to obsolete in 24 hours once we had all of their communications and locations. Hitler's "health issues" or maybe mental, prevented him from pulling the trigger on multiple attacks that would've wiped England off the map. Brits should feel very lucky the tank invasion never happened, Dunkirk never happened, and the full battery of cannons never went fully operational. The invasion of Normandy would never have been successful if it wasn't for an inadequate and inexplicable lack of German response and allocation of resources. They followed a sick man to the bitter end, and his orders were supposedly non-existent at the most crucial moments. People have no idea how close Europe was, the world even, to utter domination; all from a a few decisions and orders that weren't sent for whatever reason.

To be clear, it's very unlikely Germany could have ever invaded the UK. The German airforce literally did not have the ability to carry it out.

The British airforce cleaned their clock.

On 14 September 1940, the eve of the original deadline for the launching of ‘Operation Sealion’, the invasion of Britain, Hitler convened a meeting of the leaders of the armed forces to concede that ‘on the whole, despite all our successes, the preconditions needed for Sealion are not yet there . . . A successful landing means victory; but this requires total command of the air’, and this had not been obtained. ‘Operation Sealion’ was postponed indefinitely.84 Hitler was persuaded by Raeder to continue with night raids, especially over London, to destroy the city’s military and economic infrastructure. Increasingly also the raids were justified in terms of their impact on civilian morale. The decision was welcomed by many in Germany. ‘The war of annihilation against England has now really begun,’ wrote Lore Walb with satisfaction in her diary on 10 September 1940: ‘Pray God that they are soon brought to their knees!’85 This ‘war of annihilation’ was known in London as ‘the Blitz’. In all, some 40,000 British civilians were killed during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. But morale did not break down. A new German ploy of sending fighters and fighter-bombers flying at high altitudes - 253 such raids were carried out in October 1940 alone - was designed to wear down both civilian morale and British fighter strength. In October 1940, some 146 Spitfires and Hurricanes were lost. But the Royal Air Force had adapted its tactics by mounting high-flying patrols, and in the same month the Germans lost another 365 aircraft, mostly bombers. In November one raid on the midland city of Coventry by a fleet of almost 450 bombers destroyed the entire city centre, including the medieval cathedral, killing 380 civilians and injuring 865; British intelligence had failed to anticipate the raid, and the city had been left effectively without protection.86

But this was a rare lapse. Mostly, the German bombers met heavy and well-prepared resistance. Deciding that such attacks achieved little, Raeder persuaded Hitler to switch the bombing campaign to Britain’s seaports from 19 February 1941, but while many raids were mounted, Britain’s night-time defences quickly became effective here too, as radar and radar-controlled guns came into operation. By May 1941 the raids were being scaled down. British civilian morale, though shaky during the initial phase of the bombing campaign, had not collapsed. Churchill had not come under any significant domestic pressure to sue for peace. British aircraft production had not been seriously affected. 600 German bombers had been shot down. Ordinary Germans began to get depressed about the outcome of the conflict. ‘For the first time since the war began,’ wrote Lore Walb in her diary on 3 October 1940, ‘my constant optimism has begun to waver. We are making no progress against England.’87 And in December 1940 Hans Meier-Welcker was forced to conclude privately, as many others had already done, that there was no sign of ‘a collapse of morale among the English people’.88 For the first time, Hitler had lost a major battle. The consequences were to be far-reaching.89

As it became clear that the German air force was not going to win command over the skies between Britain and the Continent, Hitler cast around for alternative methods of bringing the stubborn British to their knees. His attention turned to the Mediterranean. Perhaps it would be possible to enlist Italy, Vichy France and Spain in the destruction of British sea-power and British naval bases there. But a series of meetings held in late October produced nothing of any concrete value. The canny Spanish leader, General Franco, while thanking Hitler for his support during the Spanish Civil War, made no promises at all, but simply said he would come into the war on Germany’s side when it suited him. In his view the war was still undecided, and he poured open scorn upon the German belief that Britain would soon be defeated. Even if there was a successful invasion, he said, the Churchill government would retreat to Canada and continue the fight from there with the aid of the Royal Navy. Moreover, it was quite possible that the USA would back Churchill; already, indeed, on 3 September 1940 US President Franklin D. Roosevelt had signed an agreement leasing fifty destroyers to the British navy. Given his unwillingness to force Vichy France to surrender any of its colonial territories in North Africa to the Spanish, Hitler had little or nothing of value to offer Franco in return for his entry into the war, and the Spanish dictator knew it. ‘These people are intolerable,’ Franco declared to his Foreign Minister after the meeting. ‘They want us to come into the war in exchange for nothing.’90 The meeting broke up without any concrete result. A furious Ribbentrop railed against Franco as an ‘ungrateful coward’ whose refusal to help was poor thanks for the aid Germany had given him in the Spanish Civil War, while Hitler told Mussolini a few days later that he would rather ‘have three or four teeth taken out’ than go through another nine such hours of negotiations with the Spanish dictator.91

You should check out Dan Carlin's WWII podcasts, Germany, in a couple instances could've made serious moves to invade and wipe out England and didn't. It's bizarre for sure, but the historical documentation supports it. The accepted theory is that Hitler was incapable of commanding properly with his "illness" and missed several opportunities, a couple while he was literally asleep.

http://www.worldwar2history.info/D-Day/Hitler.html

http://www.news.com.au/world/did-a-power-nap-cost-adolf-hitler-victory-in-world-war-ii-staff-were-too-scared-to-wake-him-on-dday/news-story/1b2fa0f13258f79fe4c2ce58013cdab1

Let's also pretend that the USSR didn't encourage Hitler to start the war with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

I don't think they encouraged him, tbh. Stalin knew the pact would stall the war for long enough to build up the soviet forces.

When Germany actually attacked he was completely shocked.

While the Soviets were in War Alone for 3 years

'Ello ello ello wot's this den?

I'll take what is the United Kingdom for 500 Alex.

Alexander Hill notes

British-supplied tanks made up in the region of 30 to 40 percent of the heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion of such vehicles available as reinforcements at this critical juncture

USA notably

It has been estimated that there was enough food sent to Russia via Lend-Lease to feed a 12,000,000-man army half pound of food per day for the duration of the war.

Glantz notes

Lend-Lease trucks were particularly important to the Red Army, which was notoriously deficient in such equipment. By the end of the war, two out of every three Red Army trucks were foreign-built, including 409,000 cargo trucks and 47,000 Willys Jeeps. Without the trucks, each Soviet offensive during 1943-1945 would have come to a halt after a shallower penetration, allowing the Germans time to reconstruct their defenses and force the Red Army to conduct yet another deliberate assault.

Its also worth noting that the US, Britain and Canada supplied the USSR with 2.586 million tonne of aviation fuel and light-fraction gasoline, which was about 1.4 times greater than the Soviet production during the war.

TL;DR begone unlearned one.

the pacific theatre don't real

When we did, we decimated them. Nice historical bait though, a real college try!

...so?

I see nothing about the sox

Terrible bait and the seriousposters still bit smh