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Remember to find your happy place
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Idk what "preparations" you need to do to post dumb tweets but he's coming home

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He's questioning the validity, permission to Y'ALL granted

https://old.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/ypiybh/what_does_gender_equality_mean_to_you/ivjc4hb/?sort=controversial

:#punchjak:

https://old.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/ypiybh/what_does_gender_equality_mean_to_you/ivjdm9s/?sort=controversial

You'll get paid the same as a man if you do as good a job :#marseytrump:

https://old.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/ypiybh/what_does_gender_equality_mean_to_you/ivjo1qj/?sort=controversial

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Article

This is the moment a chaotic brawl broke out at a Texas iHop after a family insulted a group of scantily clad women wearing daring outfits.

They were dressed looking for attention, and they got it.'

'They thought we were looking at them. Pretty much how it started,' Mychaela Horelka, who was involved in the fight, wrote on Facebook.

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Tradwife leaves catholicism, Xtians debate

It honestly really funny seeing catholic chuds cope about Pope Francis bowing to the consent-accidenters. Isnt carp catholic? These neighbors are laughable

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:#marseyglow2:

In a Reddit Ask Me Anything last Wednesday, Intel CEO Brian Krzanich opened the floor for questions, but notably ignored the most popular one in the thread: in light of recent NSA revelations, what will the company do to assure that its chips don’t contain a backdoor for the NSA?

While Kzarnich never answered any of the security-related questions–Intel PR says this is because the questions came late and Kzarnich either missed them entirely or couldn’t reply in time–one Redditor, Bardfinn, responded at length on the issue of encryption and security.

Bardfinn’s real name is Steve Akins, and in an email correspondence he describes his interest in cryptography and Internet security as personal and societal/political. But he’s quite literate on the subject.

“It’s an immense problem for the layman,” Akins says. “Cryptography is difficult to use, touches many parts of our lives, and has not become significantly less difficult in the past 30 years… In our tablets and smartphones, and the networks they connect to, cryptography is handled for us by the manufacturers. We never see it, never interact with it, and in many cases cannot interact with it.” We’re placing an immense amount of trust in the cryptography of manufacturers, Akins argues, and therefore we’re effectively “trusting them not to peek.”

Of course, everyone can’t be a skilled cryptographer, and since absolute security isn’t really possible, there will always have to be some element of trust involved between manufacturers and everyday people–but Akins believes that trust needs to be verifiable, mitigated, and distributed:

The problem isn’t that we have to trust a black box in our personal devices. The problem is that we have to trust that one black box, and many black boxes on the Internet (or cellular network) which may or may not be as secure as the black box in our devices, and the ones in our computers and the ones in the networks interoperate at the lowest common denominator, and they all probably have back doors (which makes it really hard to actually trust them), and the ones on the Internet are highly targetable by the bored kids, criminals, etc: Bad Actors.

To understand the root cause of this concern, and what can be done about it, it helps to have some understanding of how your computer goes about encrypting things to ensure that prying eyes don’t see what you don’t want them to see. For your computer to lock your data up tight and send it on its way, it relies on something that computers are in reality quite bad at: randomness.


https://old.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/1ycs5l/hi_reddit_im_brian_krzanich_ceo_of_intel_ask_me/cfjebo0/?sort=controversial

Thank you for asking this question.

I'm a computer scientist, and while my speciality is not in the field, I follow very closely the disciplines of trustability and verifiability in software and architecture.

Linus Torvald's response to this, while incredibly tone-deaf, is technically correct: a correctly-designed kernel will mix many sources of entropy, thereby negating reasonably-derivable advantages from subtly hijacking (passively weakening) one source. For most of us, this is an acceptable use scenario. The problem comes up when considering people and organisations whom the United States government (or anyone who holds sway over certain Intel employees) wish to actively subvert the communications of.

The reason the BSD engineers have removed rdrand and VIA Padlock as sources of entropy, is because there are concerns that they may be aware of the machine state, be configurable to detect when key generation is being performed, and may be configurable to assess the machine state and produce data that are designed to fully or partially negate the entropy from other sources, in an in-auditable fashion.

So long as encryption engines in silicon remain black boxes, produced by corporations under the legal (or extralegal) sway of a state actor, they remain ultimately untrustable for the purpose of reliably producing high-entropy data for cryptographic purposes — because the questions will always be, ultimately, who controls Intel's public key infrastructure and who do they want to subvert the communications security of?

Trustable, reliable encryption technology does not tolerate the forced inclusion of third-parties who hold escrowed keys to critical portions of the infrastructure and whose motives, politics, and regulation are unknown and who are unaccountable.

There is no technical reason why separate silicon, mounted on an external PCB, encapsulated in optically-clear resin that would allow automated visual verification of the integrity of the logic, could not be manufactured and integrated into every personal computing device manufactured today — most cellular devices carry a SIM card in a slot.

Only when the entire encryption system of a device is auditable against a well-tested, open-sourced standard, and can be easily and inexpensively migrated to another set of dedicated silicon logic, will people be able to communicate without the reasonable spectre of powerful entities eavesdropping and manipulating their communications.

EDIT: I AM NOT BRIAN KRZANICH. I apologise for any inadvertent confusion.

Edit edit: /u/scottlawson has some excellent technical criticism (that I think deserves attention) of what I've proposed, here. There is no technical reason that a government couldn't secretly compromise some of these modules I propose — I ask that society and technology prevents them from economically justifying dragnet surveillance of the entire populace, instead of (as it should be) individuals targeted by due process of law.

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:diddykongboombox:
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Weekly anime post 19

Yet another week I havent watched any anime, I might become a 🤮cringe normie🤮 if this goes on. Mostly due to drawing the marsey abc btw, so you better appreciate my dedication and the sacrifices I make for this community (for FREE).

Whatever, pls tell us all about the good and bad shows you watched. Found a cute little loli for """headpats"""? Feel free to out yourself here.

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Knockless Tomb Raider to be next Indiana Jones

https://i.rdrama.net/images/16874606950045989.webp

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Redditards clutch their pearls about heck house
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This is Wormbo

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:carphacker: marsey model when? :marseyhacker:
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An ode to @Mrpenny

Please come back

My black queen

I’ll never make jokes about your race,

I’ll never again wear Blackface on Halloween .

You’re the queen. I never once meant to be mean.,

Let’s make a half-BIPOC athlete I promise to be sweet

Always.

Patrick Mahomes or Aaron Judge,

I’ll never hold a grudge. Just come back.

Come back.

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:marseytariq: on the cumskin shooter

Not exactly conclusive, but another possible pointer towards him at least visiting here, lol.

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Local chud doesnt believe the TRUE and HONEST covid statistics posted by china
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