Files show exact criteria that needs to be hit before Russia launches nucear Armageddon

https://www.irishstar.com/news/us-news/russia-nuclear-war-china-usa-33220584

Leaked Russian military files reveal that Putin's forces have been practising the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the early stages of a conflict with a major global power, including potential invasion scenarios by China.

The classified documents, which were reviewed by the Financial Times, suggest a lower threshold for deploying such weapons than Russia has previously admitted to publicly, according to experts who verified the papers.

The leaked files, comprising 29 secret Russian military documents drafted between 2008 and 2014, include war-gaming scenarios and naval officer presentations discussing the principles of nuclear weapon usage.

The criteria for a possible nuclear response vary from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers like the destruction of 20 percent of Russia's strategic ballistic missile submarines.

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, said: "This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain. They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can't be achieved through conventional means."

Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft. These are different from the larger "strategic" weapons intended to target the US.

Modern tactical warheads still pack a punch, releasing significantly more energy than the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. Despite these files being over a decade old, experts argue they remain relevant to Russia's current military doctrine. The documents were shared with the FT by western sources.

These defensive plans reveal deep-seated suspicions of China within Moscow's security elite, even as Putin was forming an alliance with Beijing. This alliance included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement as early as 2001.

Over the years, Russia and China have strengthened their partnership, especially since Xi Jinping assumed power in Beijing in 2012. The conflict in Ukraine has solidified Russia's position as a junior partner in this relationship, with China providing crucial economic support to help Russia withstand western sanctions.

However, even as the two countries grew closer, training materials show that Russia's eastern military district was practising multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.

These exercises provide a unique glimpse into how Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a key component of its defence policy - and how it trains forces to execute a nuclear first strike under certain battlefield conditions.

One war game scenario portraying a mock assault by China reveals that Russia could potentially employ tactical nuclear weaponry to thwart "the South" from continuing an offensive with a second line of troops.

"The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike," the guidelines explain.

China's foreign ministry rebutted any hypotheses about distrust towards Moscow. A spokesperson stated: "The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries. The 'threat theory' has no market in China and Russia."

Putin's spokesperson said: "The main thing is that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is absolutely transparent and is spelled out in the doctrine. As for the documents mentioned, we strongly doubt their authenticity."

An additional coaching resource designed for naval officers, which is unrelated to the war simulations involving China, presents wider scenarios for executing a nuclear response, such as an adversary's foothold on Russian soil, the capitulation of forces guarding the frontiers, or an impending conventional weapons strike by an enemy.

The slides outline the threshold as a mix of circumstances where Russian forces' losses "would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression", creating a "critical situation for the state security of Russia".

Additional triggers could be the destruction of 20% of Russia's strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30% of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, at least three cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous strike on main and backup coastal command centres.

Russia's military strategy also anticipates the use of tactical nuclear weapons for various objectives, such as "containing states from using aggression [...] or escalating military conflicts", "stopping aggression", preventing Russian forces from losing battles or territory, and enhancing the effectiveness of Russia's navy.

Putin expressed his disapproval of using tactical nuclear strikes last June but then highlighted that Russia possesses a larger non-strategic arsenal than NATO countries. "Screw them, you know, as people say," Putin remarked.

The US has assessed that Russia holds a minimum of 2,000 such weapons. Putin said last year that Russian nuclear policy permits two scenarios for deploying nuclear arms: in response to an initial nuclear assault by an adversary, and if "the very existence of Russia as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used".

Putin himself has stated that neither of these criteria is likely to be met, and he has dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold. The materials are designed to train Russian units for situations where the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons, according to Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute. He clarified that this does not establish a rule book for their use.

Watling further explained that the requirement at this level is for units to maintain the credible option for policymakers to employ nuclear weapons over the course of a conflict. He emphasised that this would be a political decision.

Despite Moscow's growing closeness with Beijing since the war games and the movement of forces from the east to Ukraine, it continues to strengthen its eastern defences. William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted that "Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China".

He pointed out that many of these systems only have the range to strike China. Alberque also mentioned that Russia is still behaving in accordance with the "theory of use" of nuclear weapons set out in the documents.

He said: "We have not seen a fundamental rethink," and suggested that Russia is probably worried that China may try to take advantage of Moscow being distracted "to push the Russians out of Central Asia".

The documents reveal patterns consistent with exercises regularly conducted by the Russian military before and after Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Alberque, a former Nato and US defence department arms control worker, highlighted instances of Russian exercises in June and November last year that utilised nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two regions adjacent to China.

While only Russia's president has the power to initiate a first nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use outlined in the documents aligns with a doctrine some western observers label as "escalating to de-escalate".

This strategy suggests a tactical weapon could be deployed to prevent Russia from getting entangled in a widespread war, especially one where the US might step in. Using a method it refers to as "fear inducement", Moscow would aim to conclude the conflict on its own terms by startling its opponent with the early deployment of a small nuclear weapon - or securing a settlement through the threat of doing so.

Alberque explained: "They talk about 'soberising' their adversaries - knocking them out of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear weapons. The best way that they think they can do that is to use what they call a lower 'dosage' of nuclear weapons at a much lower level of combat to prevent escalation."

Ukrainian officials have suggested that Putin's nuclear threats may have deterred the US and other allies from providing more substantial military support to Kyiv earlier in the conflict.

Alberque believes Russia would be less likely to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which lacks its own nuclear capabilities and the ability to launch a large-scale ground invasion, compared to China or the US.

According to Alberque, Russian leaders think that while a nuclear strike on China or the US could serve as a wake-up call, a similar attack on Ukraine could escalate the conflict and potentially provoke direct intervention by the US or UK. He added: "That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants."